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Abstract
The role of culture in shaping folk psychology and mindreading has been neglected
in the philosophical literature. This paper shows that there are significant cultural dif-
ferences in how psychological states are understood and used by (1) drawing on
Spaulding’s recent distinction between the ‘goals’ and ‘methods’ of mindreading
(2018) to argue that the relations between these methods vary across cultures; and
(2) arguing that differences in folk psychology cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the
cognitive architecture that facilitates our understanding of psychological states. The
paper concludes that any good account of social cognition must have the conceptual
resources to explain how culture affects our understanding of psychological states,
and that this explanandum should not be an after-thought but instead a guiding feature
for those accounts.
Keywords Social cognition · Mindreading · Cross-cultural psychology ·
Folk psychology
1 Introduction
There is, so far, no human group that doesn’t explain behaviour by imputing
beliefs and desires to the behaviour. (And if an anthropologist claimed to have
found such a group, I wouldn’t believe him.) (Fodor 1989, p. 132).
So proclaimed the late Jerry Fodor, ardent defender of propositional attitudes
and their explanatory value in understanding the causes of our own (and other peo-
ple’s) behaviours. Anthropologists and psychologists the world over have risen to this
challenge, and the results are, unsurprisingly, complex. On the one hand, there is a
catalogue of cultures where appeal to psychological states in everyday explanation is
scarce (Henrich et al. 2010; Lillard 1998) or even taboo (Robbins and Rumsey 2008,
p. 407). On the other, it is clear that humans can universally distinguish intentional
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from non-intentional behaviours, and there is growing evidence that we attribute some
psychological states to others even when we are not aware of doing so (see Schneider
2017 for a review). If this is the case, then appeal to a folk-explanation of behaviour is
not sufficient to support the claim that no psychological states are attributed to another
in a given social interaction.
As both these observations seem sensible, the interesting philosophical work lies
in figuring out how they fit together. This paper contributes to that aim by argu-
ing that the current philosophical literature does not sufficiently account for the
role cultural norms play in shaping our understanding of other people’s behaviours.
This has the unfortunate consequence that the explanandum (the phenomenon to
be explained) these theories are striving towards does not accurately represent the
nature of our social interactions. There are two strands to this argument. The first,
developed in section four, builds on Shannon Spaulding’s excellent work on the
‘methods’ and ‘goals’ of mindreading (Spaulding 2018b). Spaulding observes that
our explanatory goals when assessing another person’s behaviour are diverse: some-
times we just want a fast, not particularly accurate explanation of the behaviour;
sometimes we need a more detailed account; and sometimes our aim is not explana-
tory at all, but rather to persuade the other person to act in a particular way, i.e.
‘mindshaping’ (Zawidzki 2008, 2013; McGeer 2007). Consequently, the methods
we use when understanding other people’s behaviour vary in accordance with our
goals. This paper maintains that this observation is good as far as it goes, but that
it does not sufficiently recognise that the methods associated with the goals will
vary depending on background commitments the explainer has: commitments that
are shaped by cultural considerations. What in North America may be a strategy for
explaining another’s behaviour when the outcome does not much matter to you, in
East-Asian cultures may be a strategy used for explaining the behaviour of close
kin. This argument segues to the second (section five), namely, that while culture
shapes our explanations for behaviour at a folk-level, the influence goes further
than this, to affect the cognitive mechanisms which bring about those explana-
tions. Although it further complicates the dialectic about whether attributing mental
states to others is essential for social cognition, recognising this feature is critical
for philosophical accounts of how folk- and cognitive explanations of behaviour fit
together.
The following section briefly sets out key terms and in so doing further delimits
the scope of the paper. Section three presents two case studies that will be used to
support the arguments made in sections four and five. Section six offers conclusions
and further directions for research.
2 Conceptual geography
The terms ‘folk psychology’ and ‘mindreading’ are often used interchangeably in the
philosophical (and psychological) literature on social cognition. It’s therefore helpful
to stipulate how these terms will be used in the following sections.
‘Mindreading’ will refer to the process of attributing psychological states to other
people, and will be used in the broadest sense of attributing any kind of psycho-
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logical state to others. This runs against much of the philosophical literature which
starts out with the assumption that mindreading consists in attributing propositional
attitudes to others, before disagreeing about how such a process might be occur.1
Recent approaches have laid out two types of challenge to this view. The first is that
mindreading may not (solely) consist in attributing propositional attitudes to others,
and in fact that much mindreading occurs by attributing other kinds of psychological
states to others [e.g. character traits (Andrews 2008, 2012; Westra 2017, 2018), or
simpler analogues to propositional attitudes (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Butterfill
and Apperly 2013; Low et al. 2016)]. The second challenge is that philosophers may
have over-estimated the prevalence of mindreading, and that in fact many social inter-
actions happen fluidly without attributing psychological states to others at all (Ratcliffe
2006, 2007; Andrews 2012; Zawidzki 2013). Sections 4.3 and 5.3 develop the idea
that this may be due to most philosophers in the area being grounded in a Western
cultural mindset that favours giving explanations of other people’s behaviours that cite
their psychological states.
‘Folk psychology’ refers to our everyday understanding of our own, and other
people’s minds. It is typically contrasted with an expert, or scientific understanding
of psychological constructs (although scientists may well be influenced by their folk
psychology, as will be discussed in Sect. 5.3). For instance, when Mo says “I like Bo
because she is really smart”, a professional psychologist may look at Mo’s behaviour
and decide that he actually likes Bo because her eyes are slightly larger than average,
and that her cleverness has little to do with his judgement. Mo’s self-diagnosis of ‘liking
Bo for her smarts’ relies on his concept of ‘liking’, and ‘liking’ is a psychological state.
‘Folk psychological explanations’ are explanations of behaviour that involve everyday
constructs like ‘liking’ or ‘wanting’ or ‘hoping’ etc. As will become apparent in later
sections, there are significant differences across folk-psychologies. North Americans
tend to use folk psychology a lot to explain behaviours, appealing much more to
the psychological states that caused a behaviour than folk in other cultures. But, as
mentioned in the introduction, this is far from standard across the world. In some
Pacific Island cultures it is taboo to talk about psychological states, so they feature
very little in explanations of behaviours (Barrett et al. 2013a; Robbins and Rumsey
2008). Other cultures place more explanatory value on the context surrounding an
action than the psychological state that caused it (see Sect. 3.3). And even within a
relatively similar group of people folk psychologies will be different: one person may
think that pride manifests itself in grandiose gestures, whereas another may think it
causes quiet but fastidious actions. While folk-concepts share family resemblances
across cultural groups, they are also highly varied.
If ‘folk psychology’ is the everyday lay understanding of psychological states,
then ‘mindreading’ refers to those cognitive processes, whatever they may be, that
underpin our ability to attribute psychological states to others. ‘Mindreading’ is the
process that psychologists study when they think a person’s responses evidence that
they have attributed psychological states to someone else. The big question is how
mindreading and folk-psychology relate. This paper largely side-steps that question, as
1 The standard ‘theory-theory’ (Carruthers 1996, 2006; Gopnik and Wellman 2012; Stich and Nichols




there simply is not the space to evaluate the different positions regarding the conceptual
resources of mindreading and folk-psychology. Where the paper will take a stance,
however, is in saying that cultural considerations as manifested in folk-explanations
do affect the cognitive mechanisms facilitating mindreading, and that their influence
has been unfairly overlooked in the philosophical literature. This is likely due to a
tacit conflation of mindreading and folk-psychology, and an assumption that if one
can show that mindreading occurs, then differences at the folk-level of explanation
can be largely ignored. Consequently, future analyses of mindreading processes need
to take cultural factors into consideration, even if those analyses purport to be solely
within the realm of mindreading.
3 Independent and inter-dependent concepts of self
This section draws on research in cultural psychology regarding different perspectives
on the self. The following sections consider how these differences impact philosophical
analyses of folk psychology and mindreading.
3.1 ‘Collectivism’and ‘Individualism’
A broad distinction is made in cross-cultural psychology and related disciplines
between “Collectivist” and “Individualistic” cultures (Nisbett 2004; Oyserman et al.
2002; Schwartz 1990; Triandis 1995). Individualistic cultures prioritise the autonomy
of the individual, whereas Collectivist cultures prioritise group cohesion and harmony.
Although well-used, these labels are now acknowledged to be too broad to map inter-
esting differences or generate viable hypotheses (Miller 2001, 2002). To illustrate
this, take the example of Iranian and Chinese communities, which both value sup-
pressing inter-personal differences in order to maintain a harmonious family life, a
trait which puts them both under the “Collectivist” label. In Chinese populations this
is typically achieved through filial piety, with strong deference from children to their
elders, which in turn is maintained through an authoritative parenting style where dis-
obeying one’s parents is firmly disciplined (Chao 1994). Iranian families also prize
harmony, but mothers often achieve this through avoiding conflict with their children
when they misbehave by remaining silent and ignoring the misdemeanour. This rein-
forces the social norm that expressing your disagreement with someone is frowned
upon, as it disrupts familial harmony, while also demonstrating the laudable quality
of self-control by hiding the fact that the child has annoyed you (Shahaeian et al.
2014, p.1119). While the “Collectivism” label captures both Iranian and Chinese pri-
orities for reducing inter-personal conflict, it is unable to generate specific or testable
hypotheses for how this might be manifested in a family setting. It is only when one
takes the time to grasp the values underlying the (behaviourally) opposing parenting
styles that one is able to see the collectivist commonality between the groups.
Although the “Collectivist” and “Individualistic” labels are broad, they do track
general trends that vary across cultures. One trend of interest for the mindreading
literature is how one’s cultural values affect one’s perception of self-hood and agency.
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Collectivist cultures emphasise inter-dependence, seeing the individual as inherently
part of a network, from the (relatively) small family group extending out to your local
society and further to broader society and your place within it (Markus and Kitayama
1991). One way in which this value manifests itself is through individuals’ strong
identification with their role within the family and broader society, e.g. as a daughter
or a father, a lawyer or a brick-layer (Miller 1984; Nisbett et al. 2001, 2004). The shape
of these roles are determined outwith the individual, by the social norms of the culture.
For example, Chinese cultural norms expect children to be unquestioningly obedient
to their parents, and children identify with this norm, striving to fulfil their parents’
wishes and goals (this example is discussed further in 3.2). What one should want and
aim towards is set by the external norms that society has associated with your particular
role. By contrast, individualistic societies prioritise what the individual wants, rather
than what the individual should want given their particular place in society (Markus
and Kitayama 1991, 230). Here emphasis is on the independence of the individual,
rather than on an inter-dependent relation with others.
It is important not to conflate a cultural emphasis on inter-dependence with an
eradication of the self and agency. Such a conflation seems apparent in the following
passages:
“In collectivist cultures [...] people think of themselves as parts of their col-
lective and in most situations subordinate their personal goals to those of their
collectives” (Triandis 1995, xiii).
“The understanding of one’s autonomy as secondary to, and constrained by,
the primary task of interdependence distinguishes interdependent selves from
independent selves, for whom autonomy and its expression is often afforded
primary significance.” (Markus and Kitayama 1991, 227)
However, as Markus and Kitayama clarify later in their paper,
“An interdependent view of self does not result in a merging of self and other,
nor does it imply that one must always be in the company of others to function
effectively, or that people do not have a sense of themselves as agents who are the
origins of their own actions. On the contrary, it takes a high degree of self-control
and agency to effectively adjust oneself to various interpersonal contingencies.”
(Ibid. p. 228)
A desire to meet the goals set for you by others is still your own desire. In striving to
meet societal norms, and to fit harmoniously with the collective, one is still exercising
one’s own agency. The contrast is not between degrees of agency, as implied by
Triandis’ claim that participants in Collectivist cultures ‘sub-ordinate’ their personal
goals, but rather between the content of the agents’ desires. In a Collectivist society,
one’s personal goal is to meet societal roles and expectations; in an Individualistic
society it is less important that one’s personal goals align with those that others have
for you. One prediction of this hypothesis about different desires is that participants in
Collectivist cultures should feel more positive affect when meeting the goals that others
have set for them than participants in Individualistic cultures. One study supporting this
prediction showed that Asian-American third- and fourth- graders were more persistent
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and motivated to succeed on puzzles picked out for them by a parent in contrast
to puzzles they had chosen for themselves (Iyengar and Lepper 1999). By contrast,
Anglo-American children were strongly demotivated to complete tasks chosen by
their parents, preferring instead the self-chosen puzzles.2 Similar attitudes prevail in
other East Asian cultures, including Taiwan (Miller et al. 2002), South Korea (Iyengar
and Lepper 1999) and Japan (Dennis et al. 2007).
The rest of this section develops the analysis of the collectivist concept of self
through case studies, and demonstrates how different concepts of self-hood affect
explanations and understanding of behaviour.
3.2 Autonomy and parental control
East Asian parenting styles are usually perceived (in the West) as strict and authori-
tarian. But, as Chao (1994) highly influential paper argues, most studies of parenting
styles (designed in North American universities) fail to capture the East Asian asso-
ciation of strict parenting with love and concern for the child: Guan is a Chinese
term meaning ‘to govern’ and is used to describe parent-child relationships, but it also
means ‘to care for’ or ‘love’ and has very positive connotations (Ibid. p. 1112). Chinese
culture maintains that parents demonstrate their love for their children by governing
them well: making decisions for them, and devoting many hours to ensuring their
children’s academic achievements—a key societal marker of a successful individual.3
Children are lavished with praise within the home when they obey their parents and
meet their expectations (Chua 2011), and so learn to value these behaviours and to
find them rewarding. Furthermore, they trust their parents to make the best choices
for them (Barrett et al. 2013b, p. 8), and are more motivated than North American
children to succeed in the tasks parents set for them (see above).
The ‘governance’ conception of the parent-child relationship affects both children’s
self-perception and adults’ attitudes to children’s psychological states. Children self-
identify with the roles set out for them by their parents and elders, taking pride in
fulfilling these roles and expecting those in authority to choose what is best for them.
In their turn, parents do not solicit children’s views or opinions in decision-making,
as they assume that the child wants to do what their parents expect of them. This is in
keeping with the inter-dependence of collectivism, where the child’s concept of self
is inherently tied to what their parents and those in authority expect of them.
2 A further prediction is that participants in Individualistic cultures should value choice and variety more
highly than those in Collectivist cultures, as ‘choosing for yourself’ from a range of options is a way of
expressing one’s own personal agency. This is one of the most studied differences across Collectivist and
Individualistic cultures, with a significant body of research claiming to support this prediction (Heine and
Lehman 1997; Henrich et al. 2010; Iyengar and Lepper 1999; Kim and Sherman 2007; Miller 2001); a
detailed analysis of this work, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
3 Academically successful children are also more likely to attain high-earning jobs, in turn allowing them
to financially support their parents and their own children. This further reflects the value of dependence
between parent and child (Fu and Markus 2014).
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3.3 Social expectations and explanations
Looking beyond the parent-child relationship, societies where individuals self-identify
through their connections with others often cite social roles in their explanations of
behaviour, and certainly do so more than societies where the self is perceived in a
more independent way. Two examples illustrate this.
The first example is Morris and Peng’s (1994) analysis of Chinese language and
American newspapers’ accounts of two mass murders. The first was a Chinese graduate
student who had lost an award competition and subsequently failed to get an academic
posting. He shot his advisor, the person handling the award process, several bystanders
and then himself. The second was an Irish-American postal worker who lost his job
and was unable to find employment. He shot his supervisor, the person handling his
appeal, several bystanders and then himself. A comparison of different newspaper
reports revealed that the American press referenced the psychological state of the
killer in each case, e.g. “a very bad temper”, “a darkly disturbed man who drove
himself to success and destruction”, “mentally unstable”. Chinese newspapers, by
contrast, focussed on the relationships between the victims and the killer, e.g. “did not
get along with his advisor”, and the status pressures of being a top Chinese student “Lu
was a victim of the ‘Top Students’ Education Policy”. Morris and Peng argued that
these differences in reporting revealed different priorities in East Asians’ and North
Americans’ explanatory accounts of behaviour, with North American explanations
highlighting inner psychological states as causes and East Asian accounts focussing
on external, situational factors.
The second example comes from Joan Miller’s early work contrasting Hindu-
Indian explanations of behaviours with those of North Americans (Miller 1984). Miller
and colleagues first asked participants to “narrate two prosocial behaviours and two
deviant behaviours and to explain, immediately after narrating each behaviour, why
the behaviour was undertaken” (Ibid. p. 965). They found that Hindu-Indians were
significantly more likely to cite contextual factors in their explanations for behaviours
than North Americans [e.g. “The man is unemployed. He is not in a position to give
that money” (p. 968)], and that this disposition was stronger in adult participants than
in younger participants (8 years, 11 years and 15 years). By contrast, while American
participants were more likely to give explanations citing the protagonist’s dispositions
[e.g. “He was just a very self-absorbed person. He was only interested in himself” (p.
967)], “at older ages Americans gave greater weight to general dispositions in expla-
nation than did Hindus” (p. 967). In a follow-up study, the researchers gave American
college students a selection of the behaviours described by the Hindu participants in
the first study, transcribed just as they described them (with culturally appropriate
substitutions to mask obvious cultural cues, e.g. ‘dollar’ for ‘rupee’). One anecdote
describes an accident where a passenger falls from a motorcycle being driven by an
attorney who was late for court. The attorney drives the passenger to hospital and
then immediately leaves to attend court without waiting for a diagnosis of the injury.
The passenger later dies. While both Hindu and American participants mentioned the
psychological state of the driver in their explanations of his behaviour, American par-
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ticipants made multiple references to the driver’s psychological states and dispositions,
whereas Hindus cited additional contextual reasons in their explanations:
“Explanation by Hindu adult subject
It was the driver’s duty to be in court for the client whom he’s representing
(context: social/spatial/temporal location); secondly, the driver might have gotten
nervous or confused (agent: specific aspects); and thirdly, the passenger might
not have looked as serious as he was (context: aspects of persons).
Explanation by American adult subject
The driver is obviously irresponsible (agent: general dispositions); the driver was
in a state of shock (agent: specific aspects); the driver is aggressive in pursuing
career success (agent: general dispositions).” (Miller 1984, p. 972)
Importantly, although contextual aspects of the situation were mentioned in the orig-
inal anecdote (that the driver is an attorney late for court), American participants
“overlooked such available information to concentrate on dispositional properties of
the agent, factors that could only be inferred” (Ibid.). Hindu explanations focus on
what could clearly be known about the situation, such as context and social role, but
the American trend towards psychological state explanations led those participants to
go beyond the immediately available information to speculate about possible psycho-
logical causes of the attorney’s behaviour.
These studies show that different cultural outlooks—broadly Collectivist or
Individualist—lead to a clustering of features relevant to mindreading and social cog-
nition. When a group tends towards a Collectivist outlook, there is considerably less
emphasis on another’s psychological states in explanations of their behaviour, and
non-psychological features relating to that person’s role, as a parent, child or attorney,
are given prominence in the explanations. Collectivist-oriented societies also foster an
inter-dependent sense of self, where one’s own self-construal is inextricably shaped
by how you perceive the expectations others have of you. These expectations are also
related to socialy construed role, e.g. what your mother expects of you as her child, or
what an authority figure expects of you as a subordinate.
By contrast, Individualist-oriented cultures value the independence and autonomous
choice of the individual, a feature that is reflected in a preference for explanations of
behaviours that cite the actor’s psychological states. What the agent thinks or feels
about a situation is considered critical for understanding why they behaved as they
did. This focus on the individual also predicts a difference in self-construal, for where
Collectivist cultures see themselves in terms of how they relate to others, one would
expect an Individualist self-construal to have far less emphasis on where one stands
in relation to others. This prediction is discussed further in Sect. 5.2.
These differences in how mental states are used in behavioural explanations, and
how one perceives oneself, have consequences for our understanding of mindreading.
For a start, it suggests that thinking about other people’s psychological states may
or may not be a clear goal of your understanding of another’s behaviour, dependent
on your cultural situation. Secondly, it suggests that if your self-construal involves
your relation to others and your understanding of their expectations of you, then self-
construal could involve mindreading to a greater or lesser degree depending on how
inter-dependent your concept of self is. The next two sections explore these claims.
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4 Application to folk psychology andmindreading
4.1 Methods and goals of mindreading
In her monograph How we understand others, Shannon Spaulding makes a useful
distinction between the goals and methods of mindreading. Unlike traditional min-
dreading accounts that present the goal of mindreading solely as the attribution of
beliefs and desires to other people in order to explain and predict their behaviour
(Nichols and Stich 2003) Spaulding recognises that other outcomes are not only pos-
sible, but rife in daily social cognition; furthermore, the mindreading strategies we
deploy (methods of mindreading) vary in relation to these mindreading goals.
Spaulding’s treatment of stereotyping is of relevance to this paper. She uses ‘stereo-
type’ to cover “positive, negative or neutral beliefs about members of social groups”
(Spaulding 2018b, p. 26). ‘Stereotype explanations’ of behaviour are a type of causal
explanation on her account, as they “interpret a target’s behaviour in terms of a more
general category, which allows us to make predictions about future behaviour” (Ibid).
When an agent uses a stereotype to understand a target’s behaviour, the agent is basing
her expectations of the target’s behaviour on her own collection of beliefs about what
that sort of person will do. But of most interest for the following sections is Spauld-
ing’s analysis of how and when stereotype explanations are used, i.e. the ‘goal’ of
stereotyping explanations, claiming that we use them...
“... when we are motivated more by efficiency than accuracy, when the person
we are mindreading is part of the out-group, and when we are more interested
in categorizing the behavior as part of a more general pattern than intervening
on an individual’s future behavior.” (Ibid. p. 55).
In line with other researchers (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Apperly 2010), Spauld-
ing sees ‘accurate’ mindreading as underpinned by cognitively effortful processes,
with cognitively efficient processes generating less accurate, but in most cases ‘good
enough’ mindreading.4 ‘Accurate’ mindreading is when we correctly attribute detailed
psychological states to other people. It requires time, cognitive effort, and practice in
reflective reasoning (Gilbert et al. 1988). Consequently, we reserve the goal of ‘accu-
rate’ mindreading for situations where “something important depends on getting it
right, when we will be held responsible for our interpretation of the interaction, or
when the situation is unusual and unexpected (Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Tetlock 1992;
Kelley 1973)” (Spaulding 2018b, 43). But if the situation calls for a quick assessment
of another’s psychological states, the reflective reasoning required for accurate min-
dreading is too slow, and so we use more cognitively efficient methods. How we go
about efficient mindreading depends on how we perceive the target. When we judge
the target to be similar to us, we are likely to achieve efficiency by attributing our
own mental states to them (Ames and Mason 2012; Ames 2004) . If we perceive the
4 The trade-off between cognitive efficiency and mindreading accuracy is what motivated Apperly and
Butterfill’s ‘Two-systems’ approach to mindreading (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Butterfill and Apperly
2013). Critics have questioned whether such a trade-off is necessary, suggesting that accurate and efficient
mindreading is possible (Carruthers 2016; Christensen and Michael 2016).
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target as being very different from us, then we are likely to use stereotyping to attribute
‘close enough’ psychological states to them (Krueger 1998; Vorauer et al. 2000).
Returning to the quotation above, Spaulding’s interpretation of when we use
stereotype explanation is based on two empirically supported claims: that stereotype
explanations are cognitively efficient and therefore a quick method of mindreading;
and that we are more likely to use stereotyping to mindread out-group rather than
in-group members. Both these claims are based on work using participants predomi-
nantly from North America and/or Northern Europe. But there is a third claim which
demands further scrutiny. This is that stereotype explanations are used when “we
are motivated more by efficiency than accuracy”. In the next sections, I will argue
that ‘accuracy’ in this context is taken to mean ‘a detailed and accurate attribution
of psychological states to others’. But this is a specific understanding of ‘accurate
mindreading’ that may be relative to Individualist cultural values. A closer examina-
tion of the case-studies discussed in Sect. 3 reveals that not every culture understands
‘accurate’ social understanding in this way. This would suggest more flexibility in the
way in which mindreading goals are related to the methods used to achieve them than
is implied by Spaulding’s discussion.
4.2 Cultural differences in the goals andmethods of mindreading
East-Asian parenting practices rely on stereotype explanations. Children are expected
to conform to a particular ‘good child’ stereotype, and it is the role of parents and
teachers to help them to meet these expectations. Being told that your sister did X
because ‘she’s a good daughter’ is a form of stereotype explanation. But if we contrast
the goals that stereotype explanations aim towards in this example, they are quite
different from those presented by Spaulding in the previous section.
First, stereotype explanations as used by parents to ‘govern’ children clearly con-
trast with the North American standard of using stereotype explanations in relation to
out-group members: parent and child relations are amongst the closest kin, in-group
relations one can have. Second, it is not the case in East Asian cultures that a stereo-
type explanation is used when the explainer is looking for an efficient rather than an
accurate explanation. One may counter that the above explanation is not accurate, as
an accurate explanation would reference the sister’s psychological states. But such a
response would reveal a cultural bias in associating ‘accuracy’ with ‘psychological
state attribution’. Stereotype explanations are accurate in the parent-child setting in
China, because teaching a child to fulfil her role as ‘a good daughter’ shows the child
her place within the broader family and social network; and understanding that place
is the basis of self- and other understanding within Chinese culture. In a setting where
the individual is ‘trained’ to fill a particular role, and in so doing comes to value filling
that role, an explanation that appeals to that social role is perfectly accurate. Finally,
one of the core goals of stereotype explanations in Chinese parenting is to intervene
on the child’s future behaviour. By telling a child that she is a ‘good daughter’, one
is hoping to influence future behaviours by encouraging adherence to that stereotype.
Similarly, being told that your sister is a good daughter is also intended to shape future
behaviours: be more like your sister in conforming to the ‘good daughter’ stereotype.
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The goals for a stereotype method of mindreading in Chinese culture suggest that
stereotype explanations are used when the explainer has a mindshaping rather than
mindreading goal (see section one). Mindshaping is the practice of molding another
person’s behaviour so as to make it “more homogeneous and hence easier to predict
and interpret” (Zawidzki 2013, p. 29). By telling a child that she is a ‘good daughter’,
the parent aims to shape the child’s behaviour to match that expected of a good daugh-
ter, and in so doing make the child’s behaviour easier to predict. In Tad Zawidzki’s
mindshaping proposal (2013), he makes clear that the ‘shapers’ need not conceptu-
alise the person they are trying to shape as having a mind. The criterion for successful
mindshaping is that the other’s behaviour conforms to the suite of dispositions you
want them to have. Although success may depend on changing another’s psychologi-
cal states, the shaper need not have this as a goal. This is exemplified through the East
Asian parenting case, where parents rarely solicit their child’s opinions or explicitly
discuss their mental states. Helping your child to meet the social stereotypes expected
of them does involve changing their psychological states, e.g. to associate positive
affect with pleasing their parents (Sect. 3), but the absence of discussion of a child’s
psychological states implies that this is not an explicit goal (Barrett et al. 2013b).
Similarly, in those Pacific Island cultures where mention of another’s psychological
state is taboo, people nevertheless succeed in shaping the behaviours of those around
them to conform with social norms (Barrett et al. 2013a, 2016; Robbins and Rum-
sey 2008). Such changes require influencing another’s thoughts, without necessarily
knowing that this is what you are doing.
This contrasts with Spaulding’s example of mindshaping: “When you tell an under-
achieving student that you know he wants to do well in the class, part of what you are
doing is encouraging him to adopt that desire and act accordingly” (Spaulding 2018b,
p. 44). The lecturer explicitly attributes a particular psychological state to the student
(the desire to do well in the class) and makes him aware of this attribution, in order to
shape his behaviour. This is an example of mindshaping that explicitly aims to change
the target’s psychological states. In an Individualist-oriented culture that emphasises
the importance of psychological states to behaviour, such explicit cases of mindshaping
may be more common, in contrast to cultures where there is less emphasis on internal
psychological states. Mindshaping may or may not involve explicit reasoning about
the target’s mind; in the North American context it is more likely to involve explicit
mindreading, but in the East Asian context this is less prevalent.
One critique of this analysis is that we do not need to look all the way to China
to uncover the contrasts just discussed: North American parents can give stereotype
explanations of their children. A mother may explain her child’s caring attitude towards
her parents by saying ‘she’s a good daughter’. This observation strengthens the core
argument of this section: that appeal to stereotype explanation is not exclusively
reserved for quick (rather than accurate) mindreading of out-groupers. The mother
may have ‘accuracy’ as an explicit aim; perhaps she is in awe of the care her daughter
lavishes on her and is deliberating about the causes of her daughter’s behaviour. The
mother can’t pin the behaviour to any specific set of psychological states, but instead
finds the explanation ‘because she’s a good daughter’ most accurately captures the
suite of motivations that cause the behaviour. The mother is not aiming for a shallow,
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quick analysis of her daughter, yet the explanation she finds most satisfying does not
explicitly reference propositional attitudes or other psychological states.
Work in social psychology suggests that certain methods of mindreading are reliably
associated with particular mindreading goals (Sect. 4.1). But these characterisations
are not exhaustive. In East-Asian parent-child relationships, accurate explanations of
close kin can be achieved by reference to stereotypes, and this method of explanation
is more prominent in this context than, say, in the US. But even with North American
cultures stereotyping explanations can be used to with the goal of accurately explaining
the behaviour of a loved one. While Spaulding observes that the methods and goals
of mindreading interact in ‘messy and complicated ways’ (Spaulding 2018b, 18),
the relations are even more messy and complex than her initial analysis implies. Two
people with the same goal of accurate mindreading may engage in different methods to
achieve it: above the Mother uses a stereotype explanation, but one could also imagine
a friend of the daughter offering a more explicitly mindreading explanation, e.g. ‘she
believes her Mother deserves good care’. In these cases it is not clear that we can
predict which method of mindreading a person will use to attain their goal of accurate
understanding of the other: much will depend on the explainer’s own understanding
of how particular beliefs affect behaviour (Curry 2018; Heyes and Frith 2014).
4.3 Cultural differences in whether mindreading is a goal at all
The previous section discussed cases where the goals and methods for mindreading can
be different depending on background cultural commitments. This section discusses
cases where there are differences in whether mindreading is a goal of the interaction at
all. Specifically, it examines cases where North American cultural biases cause agents
to have a mindreading goal, but where agents from cultures with more collectivist
leanings do not have mindreading as the goal of the social interaction or explanation.
While the aim of Spaulding’s monograph is to analyse mindreading,5 there is value
in seeing how her analysis could apply to cases where mindreading is arguably less
central.
Section 3.3 described differences in Hindu-Indian and North American descriptions
of behaviour. Notably, North Americans seemed more concerned with the psycholog-
ical profile of the motorcyclist, focusing on his dispositions as explanatory for the
incident even when contextual information was available, whereas Hindu-Indians
cited multiple contextual reasons for the behaviour, and only one or two dispositional
features of the driver. Similarly, Morris and Peng’s analysis of the newspaper reports
reveal that North American papers speculate about the psychological causes of the
murderer’s behaviour, whereas Chinese-language papers discuss the situational fac-
tors leading to the murders. These are cases where the broad explanandum is the same:
5 Spaulding (chapter one) does engage with accounts of social cognition which give mindreading a much less
central role in social cognition than is typically recognised by more traditional accounts, e.g. ‘Interactive’
social cognition (Gallagher 2008; De Jaegher et al. 2010) and ‘Enactive’ social cognition (Hutto 2008,
2017; Kiverstein 2011). However, these accounts aim to describe the mechanisms of social interaction at
a more fine-grained level than discussed in this section, e.g. how to recognise goal-oriented or intentional
behaviour without attributing psychological attributes to the other; as such, they can be set aside for the
purposes of this piece.
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‘Why did the attorney act as he did?’ or ‘Why did the agent engage in mass murder?’
but the explanans (that which does the explaining, i.e. features of the explanation)
preferred by Hindu-Indians and Chinese, and North Americans, were quite different.
These choices of explanans in turn reveal different conceptions of the explanandum:
while the over-arching explanandum remains the same for the two groups, they each
parse it differently: ‘what were the contextual features such that murder occurred’,
versus ‘what were the thoughts that drove him to murder?’. The North American
group assume that a good explanation will point to psychological features and so have
a mindreading goal, whereas Hindu-Indians and Chinese do not have a mindreading
goal in this situation. Hence, not only can a situation lead to different mindreading
methods across populations, as discussed in the previous section; the same situation
can give rise to different explanatory goals across populations too.
5 Mindreading and the folk
This section addresses the concern that the case-studies just discussed do no more
than illustrate different folk psychologies. Cultural considerations may well affect the
prevalence of mental state attribution at a lay-level of understanding, but dig below
folk psychology and a different story emerges: mindreading remains as central and
indispensable as ever before. In what follows, I argue that glossing the aforementioned
case-studies as mere differences in folk psychologies would be a serious mischaracter-
isation of the phenomenon that is social cognition for two reasons: first, it runs the risk
of eroding genuine and explanation-worthy differences between groups; and second,
scientists are folk too, whose own cultural biases may affect their hypotheses about
the cognitive architecture of social cognition.
5.1 Mindreading: still front and central?
Here is an argument for the centrality of mindreading in social interactions, which
I suspect was the type of argument Fodor had in mind when he made his sweeping
statement about propositional attitudes (Sect. 1).
1. Recognising another person’s behaviour as intentional requires attributing a psy-
chological state to them.
2. Both Hindu-Indians and North Americans perceived the attorney’s actions as inten-
tional (This premise still stands even if they attributed different intentions to the
attorney)
3. (Conclusion) Therefore despite differences in explanations for the attorney’s
behaviour, both populations’ evaluation of the situation required attributing psy-
chological states to the attorney (i.e. mindreading).
There is a rich literature discussing whether perceiving another’s behaviour as inten-
tional requires attributing something psychological to them, so premise one is clearly
controversial (De Jaegher et al. 2010; Hutto 2008, 2017; Kiverstein 2011). However,
as the current aim is to assess whether we can dismiss differences in folk-explanation
as irrelevant to mindreading, let’s allow that premise to stand uncontested. If it turns
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out that premise one is false, then it will form an independent challenge to the centrality
of mindreading to social cognition.
The above argument highlights the necessity of mindreading as a foundation to
explaining intentional behaviour. And perhaps necessity is what Fodor meant when
he claimed that every population explains behaviour by “imputing beliefs and desires
to the behaviour” (1989, p. 132). But a more relevant explanandum to the task in hand
is not what is necessary to an explanation of another’s behaviour but rather what is
sufficient. Recognising a behaviour as caused by psychological states is necessary for
grounding an explanation of that behaviour (as it marks that behaviour as intentional),
but it is not always sufficient, as evidenced in section three. Reports in the Chinese
language newspapers focussed on non-psychological features of events, implying that
mention of these features was deemed necessary in order to create a satisfying expla-
nation of the behaviour for their readers. Similarly, Hindu-Indian explanations of the
attorney’s actions all featured non-psychological aspects, again implying that these
were considered necessary to provide a satisfying explanations. Fodor’s comment is
reminiscent of a particular myopic view of social cognition which focusses solely
on mindreading,6 a view that resonates most closely with an Individualist-oriented
perspective.7
This observation affects how we study the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate our
understanding of behaviours. As argued in Sect. 4.3, two populations can differ in how
they frame the explanandum for a behaviour, with one population asking ‘What psy-
chological states caused the behaviour’ and another asking ‘What contextual features
caused the behaviour’. In the first population, we may expect the cognitive mecha-
nisms that track psychological states to be more active in generating explanations;
in the second we might expect cognitive mechanisms that track relations between
the individual and the environment to be more salient. While both sets of cognitive
mechanisms are likely to be active in both populations, we might expect them to have
different weighting dependent on the relevant folk-norms for explanations. This would
then be a case where a difference in folk-level of explanation manifests itself at the
level of cognitive architecture.
Mindreading is necessary to ground explanations of behaviour, and this is the case
across cultures. But researchers need to be open to the possibility that differences in
folk-explanations may well manifest themselves at a non-folk level, in the cognitive
architecture that facilitates the generation of explanations. Folk-explanations indicate
that while everyone uses mindreading, it may not be used to the same extent, or granted
the same weighting across populations.
5.2 Cross-cultural neuroscience
There is a research tradition going back at least to Vygotsky’s work (1980) demonstrat-
ing that culture can affect the neural correlates of cognitive abilities (e.g. perception
6 For criticisms of this position see (Andrews 2012; Lavelle 2018; Spaulding 2018c)
7
‘Resonates most closely with’, because the view that social cognition consists solely, or even primarily,
in mindreading is a caricature that does not accurately describe even the most Individualist cultural outlook
(Hutto 2008; Morton 2003; Ratcliffe 2007).
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of foreground and background (Gutchess et al. 2006) and colour perception (Davidoff
2001)). More recently, researchers have examined whether the interdependent self-
construal associated with Collectivist cultures, and the independent self-construal
associated with Individualist cultures, has an effect on the neural correlates of cer-
tain cognitive processes, e.g. perception, arithmetic cognition, and mindreading (Han
and Humphreys 2016; Kitayama and Park 2010; Ma et al. 2014). This section dis-
cusses work consistent with the claim of the previous section, namely, that cultural
differences can affect the neural structures involved in social cognition.
Two brain regions are of particular relevance to this research: the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ). The TPJ has been argued to
be critical for ‘mentalising’, that is, thinking about psychological states and attributing
them to other people (Koster-Hale and Saxe 2013; Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe
2013). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has been shown to be active when people
are asked to make judgments about themselves, suggesting that it is implicated in repre-
sentations of the self (Craik et al. 1999; Heatherton 2011; Kelley et al. 2002; Lieberman
et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2006). The imaging data taken to support these interpreta-
tions of TPJ and mPFC functioning comes overwhelmingly from North American and
Northern European participants, and the interpretations are, predominantly, made by
scientists in those countries.
If the mPFC region supports self-judgments, then we should expect to see a differ-
ence in its activity across populations with an inter-dependent rather than independent
concept of self. Ying Zhu and colleagues (Zhu et al. 2007) compared the activity of
the mPFC in Chinese and Western8 college students. They reported that both sets of
participants had strong mPFC activity when making judgments about themselves, in
line with previous research. However, they also discovered that when Chinese partic-
ipants were engaged in making judgments about their mothers, their mPFC was as
active as it was when they were engaged in self-judgments, and that the fMRI imaging
was indistinguishable across these conditions. This was not the case when Western
participants were making judgments about their mothers (Ibid p. 1312). The finding
with Chinese participants was replicated by Wang and colleagues (Wang et al. 2011),
who examined how mPFC activity changed in Chinese college students when thinking
about the self, mother, father or a public figure. Like Zhu and colleagues, they found
images of mPFC activity when participants thought about themselves, or their moth-
ers, to be indiscernible. However, there was significantly less mPFC activity when
making judgments about their fathers, or public figures.
Zhu and Wang take their findings to indicate that inter-dependent and independent
self-construals result in different neural activity in the mPFC. The mother-child bond
is extremely close in China (Chao 1994) and, as argued in Sect. 3.2, a mother’s expec-
tations inherently shape her child’s own self-identity, exemplifying one of the closest
inter-dependent relations a person will have through their lives. Zhu writes,
“The relatively heavy emphasis on interpersonal connectedness in Chinese cul-
ture has led to the development of neural unification of the self and intimate
8 The Western subjects were Caucasians with their native language being English (6 English, 4 American,




persons such as mother, whereas the relative dominance of an independent self
in Western cultures results in neural separation between self and others (even
close others such as mother)”(Chao 1994).
Zhu and Wang’s laboratories studied cross-cultural differences in mPFC activity
when participants thought about themselves or close others. Yina Ma and colleagues
compared mPFC activity across Danish and Chinese participants while they made
judgments about themselves along three dimensions: physical attributes, personality
traits and social roles. They hypothesised that the independent self-construal preva-
lent in Danish ‘Individualist’-oriented culture would result in greater mPFC activity
when they engaged in self-judgments, in contrast to Chinese participants. Their results
supported their hypothesis, showing significant mPFC activity across both groups,
but greater activity for Danish in contrast to Chinese participants.9 The researchers’
second hypothesis was that an inter-dependent self-construal requires thinking about
how others perceive you. Such reasoning involves mindreading, namely, working
out how others think of you and how that affects your self-identity. As the TPJ is
the region associated with mindreading, they hypothesised that Chinese participants
should show increased TPJ activity when engaged in self-judgments, in contrast to
Danish participants. This hypothesis was supported by the data, with the researchers
reporting “Chinese showed significantly stronger TPJ actitivity than Danes during
self-reflection on social attributes [...] but not during self reflection on physical or
mental attributes” (Ma et al. 2014, 76). In addition, they reported “greater functional
connectivity between the mPFC and the bilateral TPJ associated with self-reflection
on social attributes was significantly stronger in Chinese than Danes” (Ibid, p. 77),
suggesting that an inter-dependent self-construal causes these two neural regions to
become more closely associated in self-reflection than they are in participants with an
independent self-construal.
Together these findings provide tentative early support that culture can affect the
neural regions associated with one’s self-perception, and perception of others. As
neuroscience papers, they are each open to the problems of appropriate inference,
fine-grained analyses of voxel patterns, and the debate about consistency versus prob-
abilistic use of the imaging data (Glymour and Hanson 2016; Klein 2010). In particular,
Zhu’s interpretation of their data quoted above may be too strong: the findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that self- and mother-judgments would heavily use the
same brain regions, due to the way Collective self-construal shapes an inter-dependent
sense of self; but it is not yet clear that this is the case. However, the data put forward
the possibility that culture can shape social cognition, and philosophers working on
accounts of mindreading and social cognition should at least be mindful that cultural
differences could shape cognitive architecture, and not just ‘folk’ level explanations.
Section three argued that, in isolation, the ‘Collectivist’ and ‘Individualist’ labels
are too broad to generate testable hypotheses. In the work since discussed, I have
shown that a more nuanced understanding of which others have the most influence
on your self-construal (e.g. your mother), based on cultural values, can give rise to
9 This study, and the previous ones, have been significantly simplified to present the headline findings.
In each case, the ‘results’ reported here are based on multiple, convergent analyses of the imaging (i.e.
Region-of-interest analyses and whole brain analyses).
123
Synthese
hypotheses that can be explored through neural imaging.10 If we have successfully
identified the regions of interest for attributing psychological states to ourselves and
others (TPJ and mPFC), then we can examine how activity in these areas differs
across participants whose cultures place more or less emphasis on the importance of
other’s thoughts about them. Similarly, we can examine this neural activity across
participants whose cultural values make them more or less likely to think about a
target’s psychological states in a particular situation. For example, Rebecca Saxe and
colleagues have reported increased activity in (North American) participants when
they read stories about people’s mental states, in contrast to when they read stories
describing people in physical detail, or about non-human objects (Saxe and Kanwisher
2003). Would we expect a difference in TPJ activity across Hindu and North American
participants reading the motorcycle anecdote in 3.2? Such hypotheses go beyond
broad-brush construals of Collectivism and Individualism.
5.3 Scientists are folk too
In a survey of journals from 2003–2007 covering six sub-disciplines of psychology,
99% of the papers were first authored by academics from Western universities, while
96% of the participants in the reported studies came from WEIRD11 countries (Henrich
et al. 2010, 3). As the authors of this work acknowledge, “This means that 96% of
psychological samples come from 12% of the world’s population” (Ibid.). Henrich and
colleagues’ paper makes a convincing case for the narrowness of the participant pool
used by the psychological sciences. But it also highlights another confound, namely,
that the researchers doing the work are from WEIRD countries, with 73% of first
authors from the US. This could mean that the psychological constructs that these
researchers are looking for and testing with their experiments are themselves shaped
by the individualistic tendencies that shape those researchers’ own folk psychologies.
This problem has been recognised more broadly for neuroscience (Dewhurst 2017,
2018; Poldrack 2010) and there is plenty of research to be done to better understand
the effect of folk-psychological trends on scientists’ work. To take one toy example:
if one believes in the strong domain specificity of neural regions, then the domains
one may begin to look for may well be influenced by one’s own folk-concepts of
cognition. If attributing psychological states to others plays a central role in one’s
culture, one may be motivated to look for mindreading capacities distinct from other
cognitive processes; if, however, such attributions are less important in your culture,
you may instead look for neural correlates of ‘social role’ recognition, or recognition of
one’s place within a broader network. Folk concepts can be an helpful starting point for
scientific inquiry, and, as acknowledged in the argument in 5.1, abilities like ‘attributing
psychological states to others’ are no doubt universal both in folk-psychology and
cognitive architecture. But the fact that a cognitive ability exists universally does not
10 As a contrastive illustration, Bradford et al. (2018) claimed to find no difference in Chinese and Western
responses to self- and other- false belief tasks. However, her prediction was simply that the Collectivism
of Chinese culture would lead to less differentiation of the self, without looking at which relations would
have the strongest effect; and her stimuli were sentences regarding a fictional agent who participants never
saw or knew anything at all about.
11 Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic
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mean it is used to the same extent across cultures, nor does it necessarily imply the
same neural or cognitive underpinnings due to the different functions it may have
across cultures. Acknowledging these complexities is critical for developing a clear
understanding of the cognitive architecture of mindreading.
5.4 Impact onmindreading theories
This section and the previous one have argued that there are real differences in min-
dreading across cultural groups.12 That individuals can have different mindreading
goals in the same situation has been discussed at length elsewhere (Spaulding 2018a;
Westra 2017). But this paper has suggested that the picture is even more complex: min-
dreading methods that have one goal for one cultural group can have quite a different
one for another group. Furthermore, cultural constructs like the inter- or independence
of the self may result in neural correlates associated with mindreading or self-reference
to differ across cultural groups. While the primary aim of this paper is to make the
case that this is an important explanandum that has largely been ignored by theories
of mindreading, it has tried to remain neutral on which theories of mindreading might
best address it. Here I offer some preliminary comments on how existing theories may
be affected.
One current debate in the mindreading literature pertains to whether we ‘automati-
cally’ attribute psychological states to others and, if we do, what sorts of psychological
states these are (Apperly 2010; Carruthers 2016; Christensen and Michael 2016).
‘Automatic’ in this context means that we attribute psychological states to others
regardless of whether doing so is relevant to our explicit goals. For example, in a
popular method for measuring automatic mindreading, participants are shown a series
of scenes of a room with dots on the wall, and in some scenes an avatar is present who
can see a different number of dots to the participant (e.g. because a barrier blocks the
avatar’s visual access to some of the dots). Participants are asked to judge how many
dots they can see, a task that does not require any acknowledgment of the avatar’s
perspective. The original finding (Samson et al. 2010) is that participants are slower
to judge how many dots there are when the avatar sees a different number of dots, a
result interpreted by the experimenters as showing that participants are automatically
calculating the avatar’s perspective even though doing so in not only unnecessary for
the task in hand, but detrimental as it slows their responses to the explicit question.
Replication attempts of the dot perspective task have been messy and yielded a
conflicting array of interpretations of the data (see O’Grady et al. 2017 for a review).
One possible explanation for this confusion may be the assumption that the ‘auto-
maticity’ of mindreading is the same for all people. If someone is raised to believe that
it is vitally important to consider the impact of your actions on another person [e.g.
as is the case in Japanese culture (Markus and Kitayama 1991, p.229)] then we might
predict automatic mindreading in the dot-perspective task. If one does not have this
cultural norm then mindreading may not be automatic, but ‘spontaneous’, meaning




that it quickly occurs if the task demands it (and does so non-consciously) (Carruthers
2016).
‘Two systems’ theories of mindreading maintain that there is an universal quick
and efficient mindreading system that allows us to attribute non-propositional psy-
chological states to others, and use data from dot-perspective tasks showing a slower
response when an avatar has a different perspective to the participant to support this
claim (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Apperly 2010; Butterfill and Apperly 2013; Low
et al. 2016). Further bolstering their universality assumption, the theory also main-
tains that this automatic mindreading system is shared with non-human primates and
possibly other animals. But considerations of individual differences in responding to
these tasks (based, in some part, on cultural factors) might mean that the conditions
under which the quick and efficient mindreading system is active could differ across
populations. This doesn’t preclude the quick and efficient system from being shared
with other animals, but instead opens the possibility that the use of this system might
vary. It does, however, affect a claim to rigid encapsulation of the quick and efficient
mindreading system that some two-theorists advocate (Apperly 2010, p.154): if cul-
tural background can effect the conditions under which this mindreading system is
active, there must be some way for these cultural norms to affect it, and so the system
cannot be completely isolated from the rest of the cognitive system.13
Celia Heyes is a vocal critic of ‘Two systems’ theories of mindreading, maintaining
that the data from dot-perspective tasks are best explained by processes that do not
involve calculating the avatar’s perspective (Heyes and Frith 2014; Santiesteban et al.
2014), but rather by processes that orient our attention to the direction of the avatar’s
gaze. Her explanation of the data is a strictly non-psychological one, and her broader
theory of mindreading maintains that it is a culturally learned ability, a view that sits
well with the ideas presented in this paper. But her account does not consider the
possibility that the ‘learned’ ability that is mindreading may affect whether one uses
a non-psychological strategy or a psychological one in situations like that of the dot-
perspective task. In the light of the work discussed in 5.2, it is not clear that such a
possiblity should be screened off from the outset; again, this is another possible way
in which cultural considerations could affect contemporary accounts of mindreading.
6 Conclusions
This paper has advanced two claims. The first is that methods and goals for mindreading
vary significantly across cultures. This goes beyond Spaulding’s original observation
that we have different explanatory goals for out-group and in-group members, which
in itself predicts that two people with a different relation to a target will use different
methods to mindread them. It broadens the scope of this observation, to show that
strategies used in one cultural setting (e.g. North America) to gain a quick but likely
inaccurate understanding of an outgroup member, can be used in another (e.g. China)
to gain an accurate understanding of a close relative. This is due to different folk per-
13 It is the encapsulation of the quick and efficient mindreading system that is meant to explain how it can
operate quickly and efficiently (Apperly 2010), but this requirement is contested (see footnote 4).
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ceptions of what accuracy entails: thinking about another’s psychological motivations,
versus reasoning about what is expected of that person given their social roles. The
second claim is that acknowledging this difference in folk-explanations affects our
understanding of the processes of mindreading. For, while mindreading is no doubt
an universal cognitive ability, the extent to which it is used will be shaped by cultural
defaults for explanations of behaviour. This nuance means that while Fodor was likely
correct that there is no group that doesn’t offer explanations of behaviour by reference
to propositional attitudes, the weight given to this process, even at non-folk levels of
explanation, will vary according to cultural norms.
The aim of the paper has been to advocate a particular explanandum for social
cognition: that cultural differences in folk-explanations and their consequent effect
on mindreading processes needs to be accommodated in current and future theo-
ries. But it has not pinned its colours to any particular account of how mindreading
and folk-psychology relate. Instead, it offers a constraint: theories must allow that
folk-psychological norms will affect the mechanisms of mindreading by making
psychological state attribution more or less salient. For too long cross-cultural consid-
erations have been an afterthought in theories of mindreading; the current pluralistic
movement to expand our understanding of mindreading and folk psychology beyond
propositional attitudes, explanation, and prediction, provides an excellent opportunity
to bring culture back into the explanatory fold.
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